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Damages for Emotional Distress in Ohio
James G. Young*
W HERE ONE PERSON through his words and actions causes
emotional distress, humiliation or mental anguish to an-
other, should there be recovery by the latter for his suffering?
Let us glance at some typical cases.
Mrs. Samms was very upset. For a period of seven months
a man had called her at all hours, including the middle of the
night, to solicit her to enter into illicit sexual relations. He even
made a visit to her home for the same purpose and also inde-
cently exposed himself. She brought suit against this man for
causing the infliction of severe emotional distress. The Supreme
Court of Utah said that this stated a cause of action.'
Mrs. Lyons was at work at her job as a practical nurse.
Early in the evening she received a call from a jewelry store in
a nearby city advising that her 23 year old son owed the store
some money. After telling her caller that she knew nothing
about the matter and hadn't seen her son for some weeks, Mrs.
Lyons was subjected to abusive and reviling language delivered
in an extremely loud tone. Her employer found her afterward
in a state of shock and hysteria. She was confined to bed with
headaches and extreme nervousness. The Supreme Court of
Mississippi said that this stated a cause of action. 2
Mrs. Bartow, seven months pregnant, met Mr. Smith in
downtown Norwalk. The Bartows and Smiths had been quarrel-
ing for some weeks over the sale of a farm, but Mrs. Bartow cer-
tainly was unprepared for the verbal punishment she was about
to receive. Mr. Smith began to shout names at Mrs. Bartow that
were anything but complimentary, and a crowd gathered. As
she attempted to leave the scene and avoid further trouble, Mr.
Smith got madder and louder. As a result of the episode Mrs.
Bartow became highly nervous and cried for extended periods.
She had to make several visits to her family physician. The
* B.S. in Bus. Admin., Ohio State University, Fourth-year student at Cleve-
land-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P. 2d 344 (1961). A discussion of the
effect of this case in Utah is made in Note, Intentional Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress Recognized as a Tort in Utah, 7 Utah L. Rev. 412 (1961).
2 Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 150 So. 2d 154 (1963).
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Supreme Court of Ohio said that this did not state a cause of
action.3
Certainly the facts in the three cases differ, but the common
factor in each is an act, intentionally done, that causes mental
suffering of the plaintiff. In Utah and Mississippi this is action-
able, whereas in Ohio it is not. The question that logically seems
to follow then is why wasn't Mrs. Bartow able to recover dam-
ages for her anguish?
The Ohio court reasoned that even though Mr. Smith was
guilty of conduct unbecoming a gentleman, this conduct did not
amount to assault, and, since it happened on a sidewalk in the
central retail district, it did not violate the quiet of the home.
There was no slander. Furthermore, Mrs. Bartow did not claim
she was put in fear or terror, and there were no threats or men-
acing actions by the defendant. The court said that damages
were remote and speculative.
The Bartow case was not without precedent.4 A review of
3 Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N. E. 2d 735 (1948).
4 Huffman v. T. & 0. C. Ry. Co., 7 Ohio N. P. 67, 9 Ohio Dec. 748 (1900).
As plaintiff approached an unguarded railroad crossing, defendant's train
suddenly appeared without sounding its whistle or bell. Plaintiff claimed
that the shock from the close call so impaired her nervous system that
she was unable to work. The court refused recovery as there was no
physical injury resulting from her fright and shock.
Miller v. B. & 0. Southwestern Ry. Co., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N. E. 499(1908). A derailed train ran into plaintiff's house, making it uninhabitable
for six months. Plaintiff was so upset that she couldn't work for three
months and had to consult a physician. No recovery-the fright was not
accompanied by a contemporaneous physical injury.
Mancuso v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 23 Ohio App. 493, 155 N. E. 243 (1926).
The passengers on a trolley became frightened and panic resulted when
it appeared that the car might collide with a locomotive. The plaintiff, who
was pregnant, remained calm, but was so jostled that a miscarriage re-
sulted. Once again the court found that mere fright or shock, unaccom-
panied by physical injury, would not lead to recovery.
East Ohio Gas Co. v. Van Orman, 41 Ohio App. 56, 179 N. E. 147 (1931).
Plaintiff in error's claim that there must be contemporaneous physical in-jury accompanying fright and shock was upheld.
King v. Shelby, 40 Ohio App. 195, 178 N. E. 22 (1931). The body of the
plaintiff's mother was moved to another cemetery location. Although the
court sympathized with his feelings, it said that plaintiff could not recover
for mental suffering unless it was accompanied by a physical injury, unless
testimony had shown there was a wilful, wanton or malicious act inten-
tionally done.
Koontz v. Keller, 52 Ohio App. 265, 3 N. E. 2d 694 (1936). Defendant's
decedent came to plaintiff's home where he killed plaintiff's sister, badly
disfiguring the body in the process. Shortly after, plaintiff discovered the
body and experienced great terror and shock. As a result of this her
nervous system gave way and she suffered great mental and physical pain.
Once again, recovery denied on the same basis.
(Continued on next page)
Jan., 1966
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol15/iss1/7
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN OHIO
Ohio cases reveals that Ohio law declares there cannot be re-
covery for mental distress unless it is accompanied by contem-
poraneous physical injury (i.e., contact), or unless the act was
wilful, wanton or intentional.5 No Ohio cases were found where
recovery for purely mental suffering, caused negligently, in and
of itself was permitted. This issue was squarely met in Bartow.
The plaintiff claimed explicitly that the defendant's wilful and
malicious act caused her emotional and physical suffering. The
trial court gave judgment for the defendant on the opening state-
ment. The Supreme Court, in upholding this, said:
However, in the present case, construing as we must the
allegations of the plaintiff's petition and the opening state-
ment of her counsel most strongly in her favor, the action
of the defendant in using the vile epithets, which it is
alleged he did, was wilful and malicious, and the question
we must solve is was his conduct actionable.
6
Despite its lip service to the contrary, it would appear that
Ohio will not allow recovery for the infliction per se of mental
suffering. This conclusion has been drawn by Dean Prosser, who
remarked that Ohio seemed to be the only state that does not
recognize that a separate tort exists apart from the traditional
grounds for recovery.7
(Continued from preceding page)
Davis v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 135 Ohio St. 401, 21 N. E. 2d 169 (1939).
Plaintiff developed hysteria after being momentarily trapped in the door
of defendant's bus. The door did not harm her physically, but the hysteria
caused a partial paralysis. Recovery not allowed for mere fright un-
accompanied by physical injury.
Hilliard v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 68 Ohio App. 426, 34 N. E.
2d 75 (1941). An agent of the defendant company informed Mrs. Hilliard
that she had an incurable case of cancer of the liver. As a result she died
of the shock. Held: The agent's conduct was proper, he was only attempt-
ing to recover a policy. Once again the court held that there could be no
liability for acts causing fright or shock when unaccompanied by contem-
poraneous physical injury.
5 16 Ohio Jur. 2d, Damages § 81 (1955); Miller v. B. & 0. Southwestern Ry.
Co., Ibid. (Dicta in this case develops the argument for recovery if the act
was intentional, wanton or wilful). See also, Barnett v. Sun Oil Co., 113
Ohio App. 449, 172 N. E. 2d 734 (1961); Parmalee v. Ackerman, 252 F. 2d
721 (6th Cir. 1958).
6 Bartow v. Smith, supra n. 3, at 306.
7 Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 40 (1956). An interesting
review of areas of progress in the years that followed his earlier article,
Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 Mich. L. Rev.
874 (1939). What is regarded as the classic work in this area is: Magruder,
Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev.
1033 (1936).
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In Bartow and the other Ohio cases the emphasis by the
courts was placed on the absence of contemporaneous (contact)
physical injury. This seems to be placing the cart before the
horse. As Judge Hart pointed out in Bartow:
We have no concern here as to whether a plaintiff may re-
cover for nervous shock or emotional disturbance alone
where no physical injury follows. That is beside the point
in this case. Here, we have a nervous shock and emotional
disturbance resulting in a physical injury.8
Yet the recognition that there can be severe physical mani-
festations of emotional stress and that as a result the injured
party may seek redress in the courts of Ohio with reasonable
expectation of recovery may not go far enough. It appears there
is now movement towards recovery for emotional distress alone,
without the previously required side evidence.9
There seems to be a fear that if the courts were to allow an
action for emotional distress it would open the door to all sorts
of actions by neurotics, malcontents, people who have imagined
insults, and so on. While there may be some validity to this
argument, certainly the means are available for determining
quickly the legitimacy of a complaint.' The fields of psychiatry
and psychology have made tremendous strides in the past twenty
or thirty years, and it would seem logical that the court could
enlist the support of people well qualified in their respective
fields to help in the determination of whether or not the plaintiff
has the evidentiary basis for a legitimate complaint.
Elements and standards can be adopted by the courts so as
to form ground rules. The Restatement" could be a starting
8 Bartow v. Smith, supra n. 3.
9 For instance, the latest draft of the Restatement gives full recognition to
the development. Restatement (Second), Torts § 46 (1965). Outrageous
Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress.
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or reck-
lessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to li-
ability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other
results from it, for such bodily harm.
10 A line can be drawn between the slight hurts which are the price of a
complex society and the severe mental disturbance inflicted by intentional
actions wholly lacking in social utility. Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174
N. E. 2d 157, 164 (1961). In this case Illinois was faced with the problem
of recognizing a new tort or denying recovery. Discussed in: Note, Inten-
tional Infliction of Mental Suffering-A New Tort in Illinois, 11 DePaul L.
Rev. 151 (1961).
11 Knierim v. Izzo, Ibid.
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place. A recent case 12 suggests four standards that might be
used:
1. The plaintiff must show that defendant's conduct was
intentional.
2. In addition to being intentional, defendant's conduct
must be extreme and outrageous.
3. The plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant's conduct
was a cause-in-fact of his injury.
4. The plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered an ex-
treme disabling emotional response to defendant's con-
duct.13
Elements have been suggested:
1. Intentional infliction of extreme mental suffering.
2. The circumstances must exceed the bounds of decency
and be regarded as atrocious and intolerable.
14
These elements can be applied to Bartow v. Smith.'5 Mr.
Smith approached Mrs. Bartow, who was minding her own busi-
ness, and intentionally began haranguing her. The result: cry-
ing spells that continued for several weeks and necessitated a
physician's care. This emotional distress was a direct result of
the incident. Further, at the time Mrs. Smith was seven months
pregnant, a fact which was readily apparent to all, with the de-
fendant's knowledge of her pregnancy dating from the earlier
associations. In that condition she was even more susceptible
emotionally to the onslaught by the defendant. The court makes
much of the fact that the serenity of the home was not dis-
turbed, since the incident took place in the middle of town on
a Saturday afternoon. Mr. Smith repeatedly called Mrs. Barstow
a "g. d. s. o. b." and a "dirty crook," in tones that grew louder
and more excited as the confrontation continued. A large crowd
gathered. Mrs. Bartow's attempts to avoid Smith were followed
by louder yelling. Certainly this is the kind of behavior that
would lead one to say, outrageous! The time, place, plaintiff's
physical condition and defendant's continued tirade, all con-
tributed to the circumstances. An off-hand slur in a normal tone
12 Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N. W. 2d 312 (1963).
13 Id. at 318.
14 Lambert, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering, 25 NACCA L. J. 116,
122 (1960).
15 Bartow v. Smith, supra n. 3.
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under these same circumstances should not be actionable, but
this conduct far surpassed mere conversation.
In the past, Ohio courts occasionally have found another
hook on which to hold the defendant, e.g., invasion of privacy. 16
Yet, in each of the cases cited, the plaintiff complained of harass-
ment, humiliation, mental anguish, nervousness, etc., and the
courts felt that these factors contributed in a large way towards
the favorable decisions rendered for the plaintiffs. Justice
Crockett, in the Samms case, 17 discussing past efforts to allow
recovery for emotional suffering by linking it with another tort,
wrote:
In recent years courts have shown an increasing awareness
of the necessity and justice of forthrightly recognizing the
true basis for allowing recovery for such wrongs and of get-
ting rid of the shibboleth that another tort peg is necessary
to that purpose.' 8
The dissent in Bartow19 provided a well-reasoned approach
for the recognition of the emergence of this new tort. The posi-
tion of Ohio in allowing recovery in the event the mental suffer-
ing is accompanied by contemporaneous physical injury, or if
the act is intentional, wilful or wanton, seems to ignore the trend
towards the recognition that an act can cause immediate and
subsequent mental suffering which in and of itself should be
(and in some states is) actionable. 20 But, as seen, on the basis
16 Fulton v. Spears & Co., 13 Ohio N. P. (n. s.) 473, 28 Ohio Dec. 394 (1912).
The plaintiff's furniture was removed by defendant after it was proved that
she had purchased it elsewhere. At the time the plaintiff was ill, and she
claimed it was aggravated by the shock and humiliation of the workmen
entering her room. Here recovery was allowed for unlawful entry.
M. J. Rose Co. v. Lowery, 33 Ohio App. 485, 169 N. E. 716 (1929). Mrs.
Lowery's furniture was unlawfully removed while she was at the hospital
recovering from a serious operation. Recovery was based upon breaking
and entering, but the court thought it necessary for recovery of compensa-
tory damages that mental suffering and humiliation be shown.
Housh v. Peth, 99 Ohio App. 485, 135 N. E. 2d 440 (1955). A systematic
campaign of harassment by defendant to collect a bill. Recovery was al-
lowed for invasion of privacy, but the plaintiffs made much of the mental
pain and anguish that resulted in emotional disturbance.
17 Samms v. Eccles, supra n. 1.
18 Id. at 346.
19 Bartow v. Smith, supra n. 3.
20 See Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N. Y. 2d 16, 152 N. E. 2d 249 (1958). This is
the famous "cancerphobia" case which is discussed in: Sklar, Negligence
and Emotional Disturbances: The Ferrara Case, 25 Brooklyn L. Rev. 264
(1959), where the author contends New York has now created an estab-
lished interest in freedom from mental distress. Robb v. Penna. R.R. Co.,
210 A. 2d 209 (Del. 1965) said that negligently caused fright, resulting in
illness, is actionable.
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of a rule provided in 1908,21 the courts are reluctant to permit
plaintiff's recovery. This rule ignores over fifty years of medical
progress in our society.
Even negligently (not intentionally) inflicted mental suffer-
ing is actionable in some states, such as New York and Dela-
ware.22 The test seems to be whether expert medical testimony
can prove that a concrete result (i.e., illness) was caused by the
defendant's conduct.
In a very recent New Jersey case,23 the Supreme Court of
that state followed the same view. There a woman sitting in a
parked car was frightened by the defendant's car striking her
husband and then careening towards her car and barely missing
it. She became ill as a result. The court, in a 7 to 0 decision,
held this to be actionable, and really turning on the adequacy
of evidence of proximate causation of her illness. The court said,
as to the possibility of a flood of cases:
The proper remedy is an expansion of the judicial machin-
ery, not a decrease in the availability of justice.
Ohio's rule clearly is unsound and out of date.
21 Miller v. B. & 0. Southwestern Ry. Co., supra n. 4.
22 Ferrara v. Galluchio, supra n. 20; Robb v. Penna. R.R. Co., supra n. 20.
23 Falzone v. Busch, N. J. Supr. Ct., Oct. 25, 1965; reported in N. Y. Times
(A. P.) p. 47 (Oct. 26, 1965).
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